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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 1. 
When mandatory arbitration becomes fruitless, a subrogation 
action is the proper recourse for the aggrieved party. Both §31A-
21-108 and §31A-22-309 harmoniously co-exist regarding pursuit of 
the subrogation claim beyond arbitration absent proof of a contrary 
legislative intent. Therefore, the suit below was proper. 
ARGUMENT II. 
Liability for PIP benefits was an indispensable issue in the 
lower court and is the exact issue to be decided by arbitration 
under §31A-22-309. The existence of a summary judgment with 
prejudice renders impossible future arbitration of the issue under 
the doctrine of claim proclusion which bars litigation of claims 
which could be or are determined in any given suit. 
ARGUMENT III. 
Defendant's insurer is neither based nor licensed to do 
business in Utah. Its failure to respond to Allstate's written 
inquiry evidenced its lack of cooperation sufficient to justify 
Allstate's resort to the judicial forum in order to guarantee the 
insurer's submission to the powers and laws of the State. 
iii. 
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ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT I 
JUDICIAL PURSUIT OF A SUBROGATION CLAIM 
FOLLOWING FAILURE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
UNDER §32A-22-309 IS APPROPRIATE, AND S32A-21-
108 RETAINS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT REGARDING 
SUCH SUBROGATION ACTION. 
Both parties to this appeal agree that a subrogation action on 
AllstateVs outstanding subrogation claim is a proper course of 
action where either party refuses to arbitrate pursuant to §31A-22-
309. Brief of Appellee, page 13, 11. 10-15. The parties hereto 
differ only as to the identities of the parties named in the 
subrogation action and the proper characterization of the suit 
filed below. 
First, where PIP benefits are involved, the parties resort to 
§31A-22-309(6) . However, this statute fails to provide appropriate 
guidance for pursuit of reimbursement where arbitration is rendered 
fruitless. Defendant maintains that a subrogation action in the 
name of the insurers themselves is mandated by §31A-22-309(6) by 
sole virtue of the statute's language requiring that one insurer 
reimburse the other insurer. Defendant cites no other supporting 
authority and provides no rational or legal reason for disregarding 
industry practice by naming insurers in this instance. 
Section 31A-22-309 does not attempt to proscribe the 
procedural aspects allowed by law regarding suit on a subrogation 
claim except to say that such a claim for PIP benefits must be 
2. 
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3. 
relief requested in the complaint as "reimbursement for medical 
expenses" and acknowledged the allegation that Defendant "failed 
and refused to pay these medical damages." (R. 19, 11. 16-20). In 
view of the insurer's expertise in the insurance arena, its 
knowledge of the surrounding facts at the time the complaint was 
filed, and its express recognition of the language used in the 
complaint, its interpretation of the suit as anything but a 
subrogation action for reimbursement of the only claim outstanding 
on the matter is unreasonable and constitutes an intentional 
misinterpretation of the pleadings. 
ARGUMENT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS PREVAILED WITH PREJUDICE 
BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
FOR PIP BENEFITS, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
PREVENTS ARBITRATION OF THE SAME CLAIM. 
This appeal was mandated by the lower court's rendition of an 
unfavorable summary judgment with prejudice in the subrogation case 
below. The branch of the doctrine of res judicata termed "claim 
preclusion" acts to bar litigation of claims which could be or are 
determined in any given suit. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246 (Utah 
App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 
(Utah App. 1987). Section 31A-22-309(6) provides as follows: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, ... the insurer of the person who would be held 
legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the 
payment ... 
4. 
(b) that the issue of liability for that 
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by 
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
In other words, arbitration will determine if the defendant insured 
would be held legally liable before reimbursement may be had from 
the insurer. Liability for the medical damages resulting in 
payment of the PIP benefits is contested by Defendant based on lack 
of causation. Brief of Appellee, page 4, 11. 3-4. Liability for 
PIP benefits - the exact issue to be decided by arbitration under 
§31A-22-309 - is an indispensable issue in the suit below, and the 
summary judgment, granted with prejudice, effectively prevents a 
subsequent determination of the same issue. Consequently, the 
existence of the summary judgment renders impossible future 
arbitration of this matter. Therefore, the summary judgment must 
be reversed and the parties allowed to proceed to arbitration. 
ARGUMENT III 
DEFENDANT'S INSURER'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO A 
DIRECT REQUEST FOR ARBITRATION CONSTITUTES A 
REFUSAL TO ARBITRATE WHERE SAID INSURER IS 
NEITHER BASED IN NOR AUTHORIZED TO DO BUSINESS 
IN THE STATE. 
Defendant has attempted to obscure the facts by misquoting the 
Brief of Appellant. The impetus of Plaintiff's suit below is its 
inability to pursue arbitration with Defendant's insurer, 
Transprotection or Vanliner Insurance Company, through normal 
procedures. This stems from the fact that "Defendant's insurer, 
represented by Frontier Adjusters, is neither based nor licensed to 
do business in Utah." Brief of Appellant, p. 7, 11. 22-23 
5. 
(emphasis added). Defendant misquoted the statement as providing 
that "Frontier Adjusters is neither based nor licensed to do 
business in Utah." Brief of Appellee, p. 12, 11. 18-19. In so 
doing, Defendant unilaterally and gratuitously changed the meaning 
of the statement and, apparently, its veracity. Defendant's 
insurer is neither based nor authorized to do business in Utah, 
rendering ineffective the standard avenues for enforcement of 
arbitration. Defendant's insurer denies having refused to 
arbitrate, yet it admits to intentionally failing to respond to 
Allstate's inquiry and request for reconsideration of Allstate's 
claim because it determined that the letter did not call for a 
response. Brief of Appellee, page 5, 11. 9-10. Defendant's 
insurer's failure to exhibit the courtesy to reconsider the claim, 
discuss arbitration, or simply respond to a written inquiry, was 
sufficient basis upon which Allstate could reasonably anticipate a 
lack of cooperation from the out-of-state insurer in participating 
in actual, ongoing arbitration. Under the circumstances, 
Allstate's resort to a judicial forum was a reasonable procedure 
designed to guarantee Defendant's insurer's submission to the 
powers and laws of the State. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's position herein is a continuation of his efforts 
to prevent any formal determination of liability for the underlying 
subrogation claim. Below, Defendant denied Plaintiff the 
opportunity to fully brief its position by submitting a reply brief 
6. 
supporting its Motion for Summary Judgment in which it set forth an 
entirely new argument and expressly rescinded its reliance on its 
initial supportive memorandum. Now Defendant's insurer proclaims, 
for the first time, an unequivocal willingness to voluntarily 
arbitrate this matter pursuant to statute, while at the same time 
strenuously maintaining that the summary judgment be affirmed, 
despite its res judicata effect, due to Allstate*s failure to 
timely amend its complaint to make the obvious more obvious. 
Plaintiff at no time has taken a position that the complaint 
below was anything other than a subrogation action filed pursuant 
to §31A-21-108. Neither is Plaintiff attempting by this appeal to 
obtain an improper determination of claims and events not at issue 
below. On appeal, Plaintiff need only establish that Defendant was 
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, requiring 
reversal of the summary judgment in order to put the subrogation 
matter and the insurers in a position to proceed with arbitration 
or litigation. Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law for the reason that Plaintiff's pursuit of its 
subrogation claim through the judicial forum was proper under §31A-
21-108 and was not barred by §31A-22-309 under the facts at hand. 
Further, the issue of the validity of the Release and its effect on 
Allstate's subrogation claim as outlined in the Brief of Appellant 
forms the genuine issue of material fact necessary to prevent entry 
of summary judgment. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the summary judgment be 
7. 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this /£> day of August, 1990. 
^g* 
KrTs C. Leonard 
MATHESON, MORTENSEN & OLSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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